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Smith being numbered among the latter. The strife between parties became so intense that politics entered into all the affairs of the day. Of the various contemporaries of Smith appearing in these pages — many of whom were of national fame — perhaps the most remarkable character was George Bryan, one of his political opponents, whose career is most sympathetically presented. As the leader of the radical popular party, he was the real author and steadfast defender of the Constitution of 1776, and largely directed the government under it. He was the first vice-president of the state, and later as chairman of twenty-seven out of thirty-nine committees of the assembly he presented a most remarkable instance of one-man power, more openly exhibited than is the custom of the modern political "boss". Bryan's chief claim for remembrance is due to his authorship of the emancipation law of 1780. Shortly after its enactment he was unanimously elected to the supreme court, where he remained for life. He did not, however, altogether give up his activity in politics, and is credited with being the author of the letters against the Constitution signed by "Centinel".

In addition to the discussion of the political history of the period, the work contains a valuable study of the origin and development of the state judiciary, and presents a very realistic picture of Pennsylvania of a century and more ago, through its descriptions of the life both on the frontier and in the city, and by its characterization of the leading public men. These are based chiefly upon contemporary accounts. The work is a decided contribution to the history of the period. It might well have included a fuller account of the political contests over the College and the Bank, and of the work of the Council of Censors, as well as the struggle over the adoption of the Federal Constitution. These subjects, however, have been in part covered by other writers, and were not intimately connected with the career of Thomas Smith. The only error noted is the statement on page 191 that Congress was sitting at Annapolis in 1787.

The volume is handsomely printed and is embellished with over forty illustrations comprising a notable series of maps, portraits, and views.

HERMAN V. AMES.

Napoleon. A History of the Art of War, from the Beginning of the French Revolution to the End of the Eighteenth Century, with a Detailed Account of the Wars of the French Revolution. In four volumes. Volumes I and II. By Lieutenant-Colonel THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE, U. S. A. (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin, and Company. 1904. Pp. xx, 620; ix, 562.)

It was only eleven years ago that Lévy declared in his *Napoléon intime* that the true history of Napoleon had yet to be written, but in that time immense strides have been made in the right direction. Professor Sloane's *Life of Napoleon Bonaparte* supplied, among many other details,

abundant valuable information which no one else had been able to unearth respecting the early life of the great Corsican; and as a result of his work it was possible for the first time to understand logically the development of the gaunt, poverty-stricken, but nevertheless proud and masterful little Corsican of the Military School of Brienne, through the various stages which made him the foremost general and the most dazzling character in the history of the world. The closing days of the "eagle Emperor" chained to a lonely rock in the Atlantic "a thousand miles from anywhere" have been discussed anew by Lord Rosebery in his incisive volume on *Napoleon, the Last Phase*, and the manifold conflicting events and works dealing with this period have been weighed like legal evidence and definitely placed in the categories where they properly belong. For more than eighty years an immense amount of invaluable information lay in the archives of the British Foreign Office, untouched except by Fyffe's *History of Modern Europe*, and it remained for John Holland Rose to bring to light in his *Life of Napoleon I* a great deal of new material which had not previously been published in any such admirable form. Another work of much merit was Dr. A. Fournier's *Napoleon I*, which first appeared in German, then in French in 1892, and has now been translated into English.

Although these general works possess an immense deal of valuable information, they obviously cannot grapple with all the phases of a life the like of which never has been, and unquestionably never will be, seen again. Such a task, as Rosebery points out, is far too stupendous for any one man to accomplish and the desideratum can never be attained until all the manifold sides of that remarkable figure have been dissected and analyzed by specialists. Although the general reader cannot be gainsaid his undeniable right to demand works having approximate completeness in their treatment of important historical personages, yet this does not diminish the value of the labors of specialists who can alone, each man in his own line, ultimately furnish a complete history of the "little man in the great gray coat", whose colossal genius towers far above that of any other historical character and who for years controlled the destinies of Europe.

There still remains a vast amount of material relating to his military career as yet untouched, but each year brings more of these treasures to light. The movement in this direction was unquestionably initiated by General Baron Jomini, one of the greatest of military writers, whose *Life of Napoleon*, published first in French and translated into English in 1864, is still the model for works of this kind, just as Captain P. Foucart's *Campagne de Prusse*, published in 1887 and 1890, is a model for those who confine themselves to one campaign and who, by going directly to the original sources, follow the "Oxford system", inaugurated by Lecky, which is the best method by which accurate historical data is brought to light. A less technical but nevertheless specialized work of inestimable value is the admirable work *Napoleon as a General* from the pen of that brilliant colonel, Count Yorck von Wartenburg of

the Prussian General Staff, whose untimely death in China is a cause of genuine regret. These two volumes, based on the *Correspondance* published by order of Napoleon III, were first brought out in German and only two years ago appeared in print in English as part of "The Wolseley Series". Two other works deserving of highest rank are the masterful comments on the Italian campaigns of 1796-1797 and 1800 contained in H. H. Sargent's *Napoleon Bonaparte's First Campaign* and *The Campaign of Marengo*. Unremitting researches by continental writers are yearly producing innumerable memoirs, correspondence, and technical works dealing with the multiplicity of details which went to make the Napoleonic era the most remarkable military epoch in history, and the side-lights thus thrown on the central dominating figure have done much to bring out many points which have hitherto remained in the dark.

One would think that all the numberless works treating of this colossus in his various aspects as strategist, statesman, lawgiver, and man had well-nigh exhausted the subject but, although more has been written of this one individual than of any other historical personage, many times over, the fund of knowledge pertaining to him seems like an eternal spring, many of whose sources are still unfathomed. Historical treasures, like the most precious jewels, are generally unearthed in a form too crude for use and need to be subjected to some refining process which gives them their value. Hence it is that the labor of the excavator is incomplete until supplemented by that of the refiner, to whom the world is principally indebted for its most valuable acquisitions. In this latter category we now have the pleasure of chronicling one of the most notable contributions to the military history of the greatest of all strategists which has appeared in the last decade — the first two volumes of Colonel Dodge's *Napoleon*. There are few men living better qualified than he to undertake such a difficult work ; a soldier who has participated in many of the campaigns of the Civil War, a keen observer who for several years lived in and breathed the atmosphere of a martial capital like Berlin, a writer of unusual depth of research and breadth of view, as shown by his previous works on the campaigns of "Great Captains", he exemplifies admirably the maxim given by Napoleon — which he quotes at the beginning of his first volume — who declared that in order to master the secret of the art of war one must read and re-read the history of the eighty-eight campaigns of great commanders like Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus Adolphus, and Frederick, and by modeling oneself on them learn to reject maxims opposed to theirs. Colonel Dodge has already published works on all of these captains — except Frederick the Great, which has wisely been deferred pending the appearance of the exhaustive treatise being prepared by the German General Staff — and the years of study which he has spent in the preparation of these works is manifest on almost every page of his *Napoleon*. Only those who had labored in the way which he has done would be able to compare how General Bonaparte advancing on Turin in 1796 remembered the difficulty which Prince Eugene had had in 1706 ; the similarity between the

fighting on the causeways at Arcole and of Cæsar at Alexandria, of Castiglione and Leuthen, of the battles of Mount Tabor and the Pyramids and those of Alexander ; or to show how Napoleon's crossing of the Little St. Bernard in 1800 was "a mere summer day's excursion" (II, 27) compared with Hannibal's traversing the same pass or Alexander's crossing of the Hindu-Kush ; and how Napoleon's letter of October 12, 1806, to his "Brother" of Prussia was "a stratagem worthy of Hannibal, father of stratagems" (II, 375).

Dodge's *Napoleon*, like the other books of his "Great Captains" series, is founded on the postulate that "the great captain is the product of exceptional intellect, exceptional force of character and exceptional opportunity", supplemented by the fact that "the highest strategy is generally the product of the greatest brain". The reviewer was the first writer in English to summarize the five principal characteristics of Napoleonic strategy, *viz.*: (1) the initiative at the beginning of hostilities, (2) one line of operations, (3) the unity of forces, (4) the rapidity of movement on decisive points, and (5) the invariable concentration for battle, illustrated by maxims culled from Napoleon's own writings, and to point out that "throughout these above-enumerated principles runs the fundamental idea of simplicity" (*Journal of the Military Service Institution*, XXVIII, 20, January, 1901). These ideas have been admirably enlarged by Colonel Dodge, who in chapter XXI (II, 11-12) which deals with the events immediately following the establishment of the Consulate and preceding the campaign of Marengo, aptly says :

The conception of all Napoleon's campaigns and the simple perfection of their opening is a study. Several points are always prominent. The army has but one line of operations. Along this line the mass is to be projected. The objective is to be the enemy's army. The line chosen is one running around the flank of the enemy, upon his communications. If possible this flank is to be the strategic flank, that is, the one which most surely cuts the enemy off from his own base. And last, while thus threatening the enemy's, the line is to be such as to conserve one's own communications. These were principles on which this great soldier always acted. In other words, his rule for opening a campaign was this: move in one mass upon the enemy's army, along one line of operations, from such a base and in such a direction that you shall turn his strategic flank and threaten his communications, without prejudicing your own. Then if you beat him in the battle it should be your aim at once to bring on, you can destroy him. This theory, put into words, sounds simple ; but it has taken twenty-four centuries of war to enable any one to enunciate the rule ; and Napoleon has been the one great captain who consistently practiced it.

Colonel Dodge's work abounds in such admirable summaries as the above, which show in what good stead his previous studies have stood him and how thoroughly he has weighed every authority and every detail. The work opens with an exhaustive examination of the condition and organization of the military establishments of France, Prussia, and Austria, followed by a careful consideration of tactics and administration

at the end of the eighteenth century. No detail has been neglected; the organization of the various arms, minor and battle tactics, administration and supply, baggage, discipline, fortifications and field-works, rations and pay are treated in a manner which has no counterpart in English military literature. All these important minutiae are known to the student who has delved into the valuable technical works of other languages, and Colonel Dodge has conferred a genuine benefit in placing such valuable facts within the reach of English-speaking readers.

Beginning with an army "rotten in its organization, discipline and morale" and "as bad as the worst of the mercenaries of the Thirty Years' War", Dodge shows how the French, actuated by the subversive creeds of the Revolution, succeeded in holding head against the entire Continent in spite of the internal dissensions, the constant guillotining of incompetent commanders, and the radical faults of the system inaugurated by Carnot, who, though mediocre himself as a general, proved to be the "organizer of Victory". Although the lessons taught by Frederick the Great were almost entirely forgotten and the faulty dissemination of forces due to adherence to the "cordon system", the French nevertheless profited by the experience of the officers who had served in the American Revolution, consisting, as Dodge points out, of "the superiority of good marksmen in open order, each one taking advantage of the accidents of the ground, over seasoned regulars who fought elbow to elbow" (I, 24). Frederick the Great's disciple in France was Guibert, whose school won the day against the advocates of the deep formation, with the result that on August 1, 1791, the "Ordinance", which remained in technical force through the Napoleonic era, inaugurated a new method known as "skirmishers in great bands", which fostered "that forward swing whose normal effect so often leads to victory, and which was so thoroughly consistent with the French character" (II, 180). The result was that

The new French cry was "Audacity, more audacity, always audacity!" The French armies forded great rivers in the teeth of the enemy; they crossed vast mountain ranges with cavalry and artillery; they threw bridges under heavy artillery fire; they bivouacked without tents; they marched and fought without magazines; they waded through rivers breast-high; they made continuous marches in snow ankle-deep.

The "theory of the impossible" became a doctrine and brought into existence a military fervor and a nascent moral force which needed only the guiding hand of a master-spirit to be developed into irresistible power. The hour was ripe for the "man of Destiny".

Through the campaigns of 1796, 1797, Egypt, Marengo, the Ulm manœuvres which are among "the very finest in history", Austerlitz, "the first pattern of a great battle he had shown the world", Jena, and its masterful pursuit, in which the Prussians "lost all save honor", Pultusk, whose lesson should have prevented the disastrous events of 1812, Eylau, "the bloodiest battle since Malplaquet", Heilsberg, which gave evidence of Napoleon's belief in his seeming invincibility, and

Friedland, where he caught the Russians in a faulty position and practically destroyed them, Dodge traces the working of the great strategist in all its details. He contrasts his *modus operandi* with that of the other French generals who were governed by Carnot's plan of attacking two wings at one and the same time, and the allied generals who—with the one exception of Suwarrov who “had the soul of a great captain, but not the head”, as Napoleon said—were wedded to the “cordon system” or hampered by the “blundering interference” of the Aulic Council, a “hide-bound”, “hypercritical, antiquated”, but “distinguished body of fossils” “to which from the days of Prince Eugene Austria had owed all her reverses”. Furthermore Dodge demonstrates that even a Napoleon could not violate the fundamental laws of war without suffering the inevitable consequences, as he did at Marengo and in 1807, when he disseminated his forces and permitted Bennigsen temporarily to wrest from him the initiative and the control of “interior lines”.

While Dodge contributes no material which has not already seen print and while he closely follows Jomini and Yorck von Wartenburg, he has nevertheless concentrated in admirable form the information previously scattered in hundreds of volumes, and his work bids fair to be the best military history of Napoleon in English. Unlike previous writers who have been possessed of the idea that men in war are mere automata, Dodge is wise not to neglect the “personal equation”, and he has successfully endeavored to give a brief but complete picture of a Napoleonic army in all its details, taking care to show how they were fed and how the transport was furnished by the Breidt Company—facts of which most English readers know nothing. His summaries of political events are succinct and comprehensive, his descriptions of the various terrains—nearly all of which he has visited in person—are admirable, and his examination of the reasons which induced the First Consul in 1800 to give the principal strategical theater in Suabia to Moreau while he took the subordinate theater in Italy, his chapter on the “Formation for Battle”, and his account of the causes which made the Gaul superior to the Teuton in the opening of the campaign of Jena, are the work of a master hand. He judiciously avoids many of the pitfalls abounding in this period by declining to be drawn into such fruitless discussions as whether Bonaparte was justified in administering poison to some of his plague-stricken men after Acre, whether he really intended to invade England, and whether the Third Coalition was originated by Russia or by England. His style is generally terse and direct, in all the mass of detail the principal point is never lost sight of, and the method of presentation is clear and convincing. The two volumes are profusely illustrated, but the portraits and cuts of uniforms, while interesting and usually well chosen—one of the best being those of the “guns of the period”—are seldom identified as to source or authenticity. Although Dodge emphasizes the fact that it was his strategy rather than his tactics which underlay Napoleon's successes, yet it seems to me that more detail would have been in keeping with a work professedly technical than is to

be found in the skeleton maps, stripped of all but the bald essentials, which illustrate the operations described ; and it is lamentable that more care should not have been taken in making the spelling of names on the maps agree with the spelling in the text — the most flagrant case being the map of the Mantua-Leoben country, in which no less than eighteen names differ from the orthography of the text. An error has also been made in saying that Marmont was created a marshal in 1804 and as such commanded one of the corps of the Grand Army in the Ulm-Austerlitz campaign, whereas he did not really obtain his baton until after Wagram.

Colonel Dodge has not sufficiently accentuated the three periods into which Wartenburg has divided Napoleon's career as a general, and it seems to me that he follows too closely the *Mémoires de Sainte-Hélène* which, although among the most remarkable writings in history, are not always to be relied upon unless thoroughly verified by more authoritative material ; Thiers's brilliant work errs for the same reason in that he followed too closely the *Bulletins*, which, as Napoleon wrote to Masséna on October 11, 1805, were "drawn up in haste and on the run". However it is asking too much to demand an absolutely accurate history until all the treasures of the war archives of the continent have been unearthed and treated in the manner of Foucart's *Campagne de Prusse*. Dodge has done a notable work, and the close of his second volume has left us at Tilsit, where the emperor's star shone its brightest. We shall anticipate with pleasure the remaining volumes, especially to see how he will treat of Eckmühl — where the manœuvres surpassed even those of Ulm — and of the campaign of France — where the titanic struggle again called forth the mightiest efforts of the genius who taught the world more of the art of war than any other captain of ancient or modern times.

FREDERIC L. HUIDEKOPER.

La Théophilanthropie et le Culte Décadaire, 1796-1801 : Essai sur l'Histoire Religieuse de la Révolution. Par ALBERT MATHIEZ. [Bibliothèque de la Fondation Thiers, IV.] (Paris : Félix Alcan. 1904. Pp. 753.)

THIS volume and its companion, *Les Origines des Cultes Révolutionnaires, 1789-1792* (Paris, Société Nouvelle de Librairie et d'Édition, 1904), are the two theses presented by M. Mathiez, at the University of Paris for his doctorate. M. Mathiez, who was formerly a student at the École Normale Supérieure and later a student pensioner on the Thiers Foundation, is at present professor *agrégé* of history in the Lycée at Caen. He has for some time been a frequent contributor to historical reviews and an active member in French historical societies, and is one of the most brilliant of the younger generation of French historians. This volume recommends itself at first glance by the dedication to MM. Aulard and Bourgeois, the two eminent masters under whose friendly guidance M. Mathiez has pursued diligently the study of every phase of the religious history of the Revolution. These two theses and